Richard B. Bullock v. The Utah Department of Transportation : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Richard B. Bullock v. The Utah Department of
Transportation : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kevin V. Olsen; Attorney of Appellant.
Norman E. Plate; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for State Defendants/appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Richard B. Bullock v. The Utah Department of Transportation, No. 970582 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1114
~e(k~l <r£ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD B. BULLOCK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION; EUGENE H. FINDLAY, 
CRAIG ZWICK, P.K. MOHANTY, DEAN W. 
HOLBROOK, ALAN W. DEARDON, 
J. VANCE BEATTY, FAYE B. BEATTY, THE 
ESTATE OF REED A. BULLOCK, DECEASED, 
CLEO H. BULLOCK, CLEO H. BULLOCK, 
INDIVIDUALLY, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50, 
INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 970582-CA 
Priority Number 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES BEATTY AND BULLOCK 
Appeal from order Granting State Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss dated April 2, 1997 and Order of Summary Judgment 
dated May 7, 1997 rendered in the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Sandra Peuler Presiding 
Kevin V. Olsen (Bar No. 4105) 
ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C. 
320 South 300 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2504 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Norman E. Plate 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Attorneys for State Appellees 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. (Bar No. 0338) 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C. 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2988 
Attorneys for Appellees Beatty and Bullock 




K F U 
FEB 1 9 1998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
=T NO. J?' i Cf\ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD B. BULLOCK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION; EUGENE H. FINDLAY, 
CRAIG ZWICK, P.K. MOHANTY, DEAN W. 
HOLBROOK, ALAN W. DEARDON, 
J. VANCE BEATTY, FAYE B. BEATTY, THE 
ESTATE OF REED A. BULLOCK, DECEASED, 
CLEO H. BULLOCK, CLEO H. BULLOCK, 
INDIVIDUALLY, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50, 
INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES BEATTY AND BULLOCK 
Appeal from order Granting State Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss dated April 2, 1997 and Order of Summary Judgment 
dated May 7, 1997 rendered in the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Sandra Peuler Presiding 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. (Bar No. 0338) 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C. 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2988 
Attorneys for Appellees Beatty and Bullock 
Norman E. Plate 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South', Sixth Floor 
P.O. box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Attorneys for State Appellees 
Case No. 970582-CA 
Priority Number 15 
Kevin V. Olsen (Bar No. 4105) 
ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C. 
320 South 300 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2504 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities iii 
Introductory Statement 1 
Statement of the Case 2 
Argument 5 
I. DID THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT RATIFY THE 
SALE OF THE PROVO CANYON PROPERTY BY 
HIS PARTNERS? 5 
II. DOES §78-12-26(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953 AS AMENDED) BAR ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
EXCEPT 7 AND 10? 8 
III. WERE THE ESTATE OF REED A. BULLOCK, DECEASED, 
AND CLEO H. BULLOCK AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE REED A. BULLOCK ESTATE PROPERLY 
DISMISSED AS DEFENDANTS? 9 
Conclusion 11 
Certificate of Service 13 
Addendum 14 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
117 Sales Corp. V. Olsen (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 645, 649, 145 Cal.Rptr. 778 . . . . 10 
American Theater Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 308, 80 P.2d 922 9 
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982) 6 
Cove View Excavating and Construction Co v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 478 
(Utah App. 1988) 7 
Filmservice Laboratories, Inc. v. Harvey Bernhard Enterprises, 256 Cal.Rptr. 735 
(Cal.App 2 Dist. 1989) 10 
Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203 at 217, 41 P.2d 281 at 287 (1935) 5 
Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co., 81 Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256 (1932) 6 
Kenworthy v. Brown (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 298, 301, 56 Cal.Rptr. 461 10 
Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 9 
Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1974) 6 
Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 609 7 
Moses v. Archie McFarland & Son, 119 Utah at 607, 230 P.2d 15 573-574 6 
Schlotthauer v. Sanders, (Sup.Ct.App.Div. 1989) 545 N.Y.S.2d 197 
(A.D. 2 Dept. 1989) 10 
Williams v. Arpie, 44 N.Y.2d 689, 405 N.Y.S.2d 437, 376 N.E.2d 909 11 
Zions First Nat'l. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., (S.Ct. 1988) 762 P.2d 1090 4 
Statutes Cited 
U.C.A. § 78-12-25 (1953 as amended) 10 
U.C.A. § 78-12-26(3) (1953 as amended) 3, 8 
ii 
Other Authorities Cited 
Restatement of Agency §§ 98, 99 5 
Williston on Contracts 805 (Rev.ed.) 6 
59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnerships, § 273 8 
i i i 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The sale was ratified by the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was informed of the pending sale of the partnership property when the first 
papers were signed in October, 1991. He had a conversation with the State highway 
representative January 2, 1992 and wrote a letter January 13, 1992 explaining objections to the 
transaction, which he apparently understood in detail. The State paid for the property in March, 
1992 and paid plaintiff his share in September, 1992 with the detail of the distribution. 
Plaintiff cashed his check without protest until six months later when he filed an action 
which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. That constitutes ratification. 
POINT II. The present action is barred by the statute of limitations as to fraud. 
The Complaint alleges conspiracy, but the basis is fraud and, therefore, §78-1-26(3), 
U.C.A., governs. The delay in filing was more than three (3) years and it is, therefore, barred. 
POINT III. The trial court dismissed the Estate of Reed A. Bullock and Cleo H. Bullock as 
personal representative of that estate, both because the estate had not been opened and because 
there was no showing that there was anything in that estate. 
IV 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The Beatty and Bullock Appellees do not question the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. 
The Appellant in his brief has a Statement of the Issues Presented for Review. Paragraph 
1 concerns the State defendants and their defense under Utah Code Annotated §63-30-1, et seq. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 deal with the question of whether the sale of the property involved in the 
action was ratified under the facts of the case, which are established and were properly 
determined on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Paragraph 4 is the question whether there was 
ratification as to the State of Utah and also whether Appellant's partners were released from 
liability. It is submitted that the release of Appellant's partners apart from ratification was not 
the subject of the Order in this case and is not before this Court. The question of ratification 
as it affects the State of Utah is covered by the attorney representing the State of Utah and those 
defendants. 
Paragraph 5 states, "The standard of review for each of the above issues is for 
correctness of the trial court's conclusions. There is no deference given to the trial court's legal 
conclusions." We concur with that statement and accept the Court's Findings of Fact on these 
issues, which, apparently, the Appellant also does. 
The Appellant has made a copy of a Minute Entry as an appendix to his brief. These 
Appellees (hereinafter referred to as "Beatty Appellees") submit that the more pertinent 
document is the Court's Order of Summary Judgment, which was entered based upon the Minute 
Entry. A copy of that Order of Summary Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
The Appellant confines his argument insofar as these Beatty Appellees are concerned to 
the issue of ratification of the sale of the property. If the Court affirms the Judgment on that 
1 
basis, that will terminate the lawsuit. If the Appellate Court disagrees with the application of 
ratification to the sale of the property, there will then be an issue as to the statute of limitations, 
which was covered by the Court's Order of Summary Judgment and which was not briefed by 
Appellant. 
There apparently is no issue remaining as to whether Cleo Bullock was properly named 
as a defendant as personal representative of the Estate of Reed A. Bullock and whether there was 
any other personal representative of Reed A. Bullock, deceased. 
The Order of Summary Judgment reserved issues as to whether there was a written 
agreement of limited partnership and whether Cleo H. Bullock and Faye B. Beatty were limited 
partners. The said Order also left unresolved Causes of Action 7 and 10 if there was error in 
the holding that there was ratification of the sale. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court treated the pleadings as establishing an agreement of limited 
partnership with four general partners. The partnership owned property in the mouth of Provo 
Canyon, which was bought by the State of Utah. Following negotiations an agreement of sale 
was entered into (See R. 42-46), which was objected to by the Plaintiff-Appellant because he had 
not been included in the agreement (R). His objections were stated in the letter dated January 
13, 1992, which he addressed to the State Department of Transportation (Addendum 3). 
Thereafter, a deed to the property was made; the sale was consummated and the money was paid 
by the State of Utah to the partnership. This was in March 1992. In September 1992, the two 
active general partners issued a check to the Plaintiff-Appellant on a partnership check in the 
amount of $67,198.43 together with a description of the sale price of the property less taxes and 
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a showing of how the remainder was divided into four parts, one-fourth for each of the three 
general partners and one-fourth to the Plaintiff-Appellant as a general partner, less the payment 
of a note plus interest due to Reed Bullock by Plaintiff-Appellant, with a net check to Richard 
Bullock (R. 235). Copy is attached as Addendum 4. There was no comment or criticism at the 
time that check was deposited in September 1992 until March 1993 when an action was filed in 
the Federal District Court by the Plaintiff-Appellant objecting to the sale and seeking to set the 
transaction aside and for damages. 
The Complaint alleges fraud by the partners who managed the sale and the issue of 
statute of limitations as to actions for fraud was raised by these Beatty Appellees and was 
affirmatively ruled on by the District Judge in the Order of Summary Judgment (R. 348-352), 
copy of which is attached to this brief as Addendum 2. 
We, therefore, address three issues: 
t. Did the Plaintiff-Appellant ratify the sale of the Provo Canyon property by his 
partners? 
%. Does §78-12-26(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), bar all causes of 
action except 7 and 10? (See Addendum 1.) 
£. Were the Estate of Reed A. Bullock, deceased, and Cleo H. Bullock as personal 
representative of the Reed A. Bullock Estate properly dismissed as defendants? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT RATIFY THE SALE OF 
THE PROVO CANYON PROPERTY BY HIS PARTNERS? 
The Order of Summary Judgment finds that the letter written by Plaintiff-Appellant on 
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January 13, 1992 (erroneously referred to in Finding No. 1 as a letter by Defendants in the 
Court's Order) together with the details on the voucher attached to the check delivered to the 
Plaintiff-Appellant on about September 10, 1992, fully informed the Plaintiff-Appellant as to the 
details of the sale and division of the proceeds, and his failure to take any action for a period 
of approximately six months amounted to ratification of the sale. 
It thus appears that the Order assumed that the delivery of the check was not, in and of 
itself, sufficient to constitute ratification by cashing of the check and that it was important to 
show that the Plaintiff-Appellant was fully informed as to the nature of the transaction and that 
he failed to do anything about it, thereby indicating his acquiescence, which amounted to 
ratification. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant cites no case where a check was cashed and the pertinent facts 
were known to the person cashing the check and where there was held to be no ratification. 
Appellant cites the case of Zions First Nat'l. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., (S.Ct. 1988) 
762 P.2d 1090, three times in his brief. That case involves an action by the bank to compel a 
customer to be bound by a note which contained a stamped signature, where checks had been 
issued with a stamped signature, where the bank had honored the checks and the note and the 
depositor had not repudiated those documents and the stamped signatures. The trial court had 
granted summary judgment, noting that the bank's Vice President had said, "Plaintiff does not 
know of any specific authorization for Zions First National Bank to accept stamped signatures 
on defendant's checks. Also, Clark claimed that Zions cashed several checks with unauthorized 
endorsements and that Clark was damaged by all of the above." (P. 1095) The court noted that 
there were issues as to whether Clark had exercised reasonable care and promptness and also 
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whether the bank's actions were negligent, or were reasonable and were exercised in good faith. 
(P. 1098) For that reason, the court ordered a new trial. The court said that ratification was 
not the basis of the trial court's ruling but that it might become an issue at the new trial and, 
therefore, reviewed the principles of ratification at pages 1098-1100. 
The court noted in that case that ratification must be under circumstances of 
acquiescence, or that a duty to disaffirm is not exercised, that knowledge of the facts is a pre-
requisite, and made some specific references to ratification by banks. The court then noted that 
the bank had argued that "A principal may not retain the benefits of a contract entered into by 
an alleged unauthorized agent and still repudiate the contract," which it says is not entirely 
accurate. Neither was it applicable in that case. The court then quoted from Restatement of 
Agency as to receipted benefits as an affirmance, which in §98 requires knowledge of the facts 
and is ratification "unless at the time of such receipt he repudiates the act." And if he does, his 
receipt of the benefits still "constitutes an affirmance at the election of the other party to the 
transaction." Then the court quotes §99 of the Restatement of Agency as follows: 
Section 99. Retention of Benefits as Affirmance 
The retention by a purported principal, with knowledge of the facts and 
before he has changed his position, of something which he is not entitled 
to retain unless an act purported to be done on his account is affirmed and 
to which he makes no claim except through such act, constitutes an 
affirmance unless at the time of such retention he repudiates the act. Even 
if he repudiates the act, his retention constitutes an affirmance at the 
election of the other party to the transaction. (P. 1099 (emphasis 
added) 
The court then quotes from Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203 at 217, 41 P.2d 281 at 287 
(1935), as follows: 
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When a principal claims the benefits of a contract made by his agent, he 
cannot repudiate the acts of this agent on the ground such acts were 
unauthorized. Accepting a contract and claiming the fruits thereof, the 
principal takes with whatever taint attaches to its origin. (86 Utah at 217) 
As to knowledge of the facts, the Court is referred to Exhibit B pages 1-4 (R42-49), 
which consists of the contract dated in November, 1991, the offer to purchase the right of way, 
a full description of the preliminary contract dated October 25, 1991, an illegible copy of a legal 
description and a copy of an agreement of easement prepared in February 1988 (Addendum 5). 
It thus appears that Plaintiff-Appellant was folly informed as to the nature of the transaction and 
his only objection, in his letter of January 13, 1992, was that he wasn't being included as a 
signer. He was not objecting to sale of the property, as he concluded 'so that hopefully a sale 
to the state of Utah can be effectuated." His letter also refers to an earlier conversation on 
January 2, 1992 where they discussed "the documentation agreeing to sell the Provo Canyon real 
property 
to the State of Utah." (R. 47) 
The Appellant also cites Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), where the court 
held that there was no ratification of a sale of property by an agent to eight grantees where two 
of the grantees had no notice of the agreement until they saw the deeds and where the statute 
of frauds was applied as requiring that an agent executing a deed to convey property must have 
authority in writing, which the agent did not have. The court held that ratification was not 
shown and that the trial court was in error, and noted that a proper ratification is binding and 
can't be revoked and then stated: 
However, a ratification requires a principal to have knowledge of all 
material facts and an intent to ratify. Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co., 81 
Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256 (1932). Under some circumstances failure to 
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disaffirm may constitute ratification of the agent's acts. In quoting 1 
Williston on Contracts 805 (Rev.ed.), this Court stated in Moses v. Archie 
McFarland & Son, 119 Utah at 607, 230 P.2d 15 573-574 (emphasis 
added): 
Ratification like original authority need not be express. Any conduct 
which indicates assent by the purported principal to become a party to the 
transaction or which is justifiable only if there is ratification is sufficient. 
Even silence with full knowledge of the facts may manifest affirmance and 
thus operate as a ratification. The person with whom the agent dealt with 
will so obviously be deceived by assuming the professed agent was 
authorized to act as such, that the principal is under a duty to undeceive 
him. ... So a purported principal may not be wilfully ignorant, nor may 
he purposely shut his eyes to means of information within his possession 
and control and thereby escape ratification 'if the circumstances are such 
that he could reasonably have been expected to dissent unless he were 
willing to be a party to the transaction/ . . . (P. 78) 
Appellant also cites Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1974) under the 
statement that "Intent to ratify can be implied when a duty to disaffirm is not promptly 
exercised." We agree that that is a sound statement of the law and it is confirmed by Lowe, 
supra, where it was held that there was ratification because there had been no disaffirmance. 
That court held that there was proper disclosure contained in a shareholder report and the court 
thus stated the rule: 
Ratification is expressed or implied. Implied, where it arises under 
circumstances of acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not 
promptly exercised. Knowledge, usually, is a requisite to any form of 
ratification. (1299) 
Cove View Excavating and Construction Co v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 
1988), is a case involving accord and satisfaction based on acceptance of a check which had an 
endorsement on the back that it was full payment, which endorsement was crossed out and the 
check cashed. The trial court had held that this did not satisfy the debt. The Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court and said: 
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In light of the express condition on the check, the fact that Grundy did not 
subjectively intend to accept the check as full payment of Flynn's 
obligation is legally irrelevant. A creditor may not disregard the condition 
attached to a check tendered in full payment of an unliquidated or disputed 
claim. Mart on Remodeling, 706 P. 2d at 609. Grundy's options were to 
accept the check on Flynn's terms or return it. . . . His negotiation of 
Flynn's check was an acceptance of Flynn's offer of full payment, 
notwithstanding his lack of any actual intent to accept it as such. 
The letter from Appellant to Alan W. Deardon dated January 13, 1992, which is attached 
as Addendum 3, shows that the Plaintiff-Appellant was well acquainted with the transaction that 
was pending, what property was sold, what the status of the partnership was and that the 
property in Provo Canyon involved all of the partnership's assets, and concludes with the 
statement that, "hopefully a sale to the State of Utah can be effectuated." The letter also refers 
to the signers of the agreement and the power of attorney of Reed Bullock and sends copies of 
the letter to all of the involved persons. Then details of the conclusion of the transaction were 
contained in the check mailed to the Appellant on September 10, 1992 and cashed by him on 
September 18, 1992, in which the total price was shown with the deduction for taxes and the 
division of the net amount into four shares for four general partners, including the Plaintiff-
Appellant, and with a deduction from the Appellant's share for money owing to Reed Bullock 
(Addendum 4). There is no indication of what additional knowledge Appellant could have 
wanted to inform him as to the nature of the impending sale. 
Ratification of the act of a partner can be measured by the following statement: 
Ratification of a partner's unauthorized acts may be implied from the 
partnership's acceptance of the benefits of the transaction in accordance 
with the principle of agency that one who accepts or retains the benefits 
or proceeds of the unauthorized acts of his agent, with knowledge of 
material facts surrounding the transaction, is deemed to have ratified those 
acts. 59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnerships, § 273. 
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Contrary to Appellant's argument under Point C at pages 25 and 26, ratification results 
in release from liability of the person whose acts are being approved. That is the holding of 
Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461, which he cites. And the argument about confidential 
relationship has nothing to do with ratification. 
POINT n 
DOES § 78-12-26(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED), 
BAR ALL CAUSES OF ACTION EXCEPT 7 AND 10? 
Appellant knew of the impending sale prior to January 13, 1992, because in that letter 
he refers to a prior telephone conversation discussing the matter. In any event, he was notified 
of the sale when he received the check and the voucher dated September 10, 1992, which he 
cashed on September 18, 1992. An action filed in Federal Court May 24, 1994 was not served. 
An Amended Complaint was filed and served September 18, 1994 and that action was dismissed 
November 18, 1994. A Complaint was filed in the Third District Court of Utah on March 1, 
1996, which was served on the first of the defendants on June 26, 1996. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-26(3) provides that civil actions for fraud must be 
commenced within three years after knowledge of the fraud is obtained. From September 10, 
1992 to March 1, 1996, is obviously three years, five and one-half months. From January 13, 
1992 to March 1, 1996 is obviously four years. If the commencement date is January 13, 1992 
when the letter was written, the delay is obviously four years and one and one-half months. 
It is Defendants-Appellees' position that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the 
action in the Federal Court because the Court lacked jurisdiction and on that ground, the action 
was dismissed. American Theater Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 308, 80 P.2d 922, holds that 
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the filing of an action in the City Court did not toll the statute of limitations because that court 
lacked jurisdiction. The same rule should apply to an action in the Federal Court, which was 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Judge Peuler ruled in the Order attached to this Brief that the statute of limitations barred 
all except causes of action 7 and 10. 
In the District Court the Plaintiff-Appellant challenged application of U.C.A. §78-12-
26(3) to some of the causes of action because he alleged a conspiracy and not fraud as such. 
These Defendants argued that conspiracy does not have a cause of action and that rather than 
have the four-year statute of limitations under U.C.A. §78-12-25 apply, the statute relating to 
the underlying basis of the conspiracy determined the application of the statute of limitations. 
The trial judge ruled that the three-year statute applied because the conspiracy involved fraud. 
This issue was resolved in Filmservice Laboratories, Inc. v. Harvey Bernhard Enterprises, 256 
Cal.Rptr. 735 (Cal.App 2 Dist. 1989), where the court ruled that the statute of limitations for 
conspiracy to commit fraud is the statute of limitations for fraud as follows: 
It is established that no cause of action exists for conspiracy, per se. 
Whether or not a cause of action for conspiracy is timely must be 
determined by reference to the statute of limitations applicable to the 
underlying cause of action (Kenworthy v. Brown (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 
298, 301, 56 Cal.Rptr. 461; 117 Sales Corp. V. Olsen (1978) 80 
Cal.App.3d 645, 649, 145 Cal.Rptr. 778.) In this case the underlying 
cause of action is for fraudulent conveyance, which we have found to be 
time-barred. That being the case we find the fifth cause of action for 
conspiracy is also time-barred. (Pg. 742) 
A similar case is Schlotthauer v. Sanders, (Sup.Ct.App.Div. 1989) 545 N.Y.S.2d 197 
(A.D. 2 Dept. 1989), in which as to the two causes of action which alleged a civil conspiracy 
to defraud the plaintiff of a substantial interest in her property, the court held: 
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The plaintiffs seventh and eighth causes of action, which allege civil 
conspiracy, must similarly be dismissed, with prejudice, as time-barred 
because conspiracy is not an independent tort, and is time-barred when the 
substantive tort underlying it is time-barred {see, Williams v. Arpie, 44 
N.Y.2d 689, 405 N.Y.S.2d 437, 376 N.E.2d 909). 
POINT III 
WERE THE ESTATE OF REED A. BULLOCK, DECEASED, AND 
CLEO H. BULLOCK AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
REED A. BULLOCK ESTATE PROPERLY DISMISSED AS DEFENDANTS? 
Appellant does not challenge this and Judge Peuler held that the Estate of Reed A. 
Bullock and Cleo H. Bullock as personal representative should not be parties because the estate 
has not been opened and there is no showing that there are any assets or that the estate ever will 
be opened. This will be immaterial if this Court affirms Judge Peuler's Order. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Appellant was well-informed as to the nature of the pending sale to the State of 
Utah of the Provo Canyon property. The documents, which are exhibits in the complaint, explain 
fully the nature of the transaction. He discussed it on the telephone on January 2, 1992, and 
reviewed it in his letter of January 13, 1992, in which his only question or criticism was that 
he had not been a signer and the partnership had no right to sell the property and deed it away 
without his signature. His letter and his telephone conversation did not challenge the selling of 
the property but only trying to do so without his signature. He received the check in September 
1992 with a full explanation of the disbursement of the proceeds, which check he deposited 
within about five days with no protest of any kind. It wasn't until almost six months later that 
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he apparently changed his mind and decided to make trouble. The trial judge properly held that 
the sale was ratified upon these facts. 
If the Court rules against the District Judge's Order on ratification, the application of the 
statute of limitations must be addressed. It is submitted that the three-year statute applies on the 
conspiracy to defraud and the fraudulent allegations in all of the causes of action except numbers 
7 and 10, as ruled by the District Judge. A filing of the action in the Federal District Court, 
which did not have jurisdiction, did not toll the statute. The filing of the action in March 1996 
was well over three years after the check in payment was received and deposited and more than 
four years after the Plaintiff-Appellant's letter of January 13, 1992. 
The Order of the District Judge rules that the Estate of Reed Bullock and Cleo Bullock 
as Personal Representative of that estate are not proper parties to the action. 
DATED this lb day of February, 1998. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C, 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. ^ 
Attorneys for Appellees Beatty and Bullock 
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5. Contract dated in November, 1991, the offer to purchase the right of way, a full 
description of the contract dated October 25, 1991, an illegible copy of a legal 
description and a copy of an agreement of easement prepared in February 1988 
Tabl 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur- 2CL — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and Application of statute of limitations in pri-
Construction Contracts § 114. vate tort actions based on injury to persons or 
/JUL — What statute of limitations gov- property caused by underground flow of con-
ems action by contractee for defective or im- taminants, 11 AX.R 5th 438. 
rproper performance ofwork by private building Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions <s=> 
contractor, 1 AX.R.3d 914. ^ 55(3). 
Time of discovery as affecting running of 
statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 
49AL.R4th972. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that 
when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works 
upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or 
trespass; 
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including ac-
tions for specific recovery thereof; except that in ail cases where the 
subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term 
livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the 
possession of the animal by the defendant; 
(3) *for relief on the ground of fraud or mista^a; exce.pt that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake; 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a 
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special 
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state; 
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except t ha t the cause 
of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably 
should know of the harm suffered. 
jHiirtory: L. 1951, ch- 58, § 1; c. 1943, 
Bppp., 104-12-26; L, 1986, ch. 143, § 1; 1996, 
& l79, § 111. 
aendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
nt, effective April 29, 1996, in the introduc-
r paragraph, substituted "An action may be 
jjght within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac-
&*,at the beginning of Subsections (1) to (5), 
l.made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — "Action" includes spe-
cial proceeding, § 78-12-46. 
Livestock branding, Title 4, Chapter 24 
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3 
Right of action for waste, § 78-38-2 
Three-year period for actions on insurance 
contracts, § 31A-21-313. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
ting, 
to personal property, 
to real property 
rule. 
Fraud. 
— In general. 
— Application 
— Running of statute 
— Health care malpractice 
Injury to real property 
277 
Tab 2 
Richard L. Bird, Jr., (UT Bar #0338) 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants J. Vance Beatty, 
Faye B. Beatty and Cleo H. Bullock 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2988 
Telephone: (801) 328-8987 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD B. BULLOCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, EUGENE H. 
FINDLAY, CRAIG ZWICK, P. K. 
MOHANTY, DEAN W. HOLBROOK, 
ALAN W. DEARDON, J. VANCE 
BEATTY, FAYE B. BEATTY, THE 
ESTATE OF REED A. BULLOCK, 
Deceased, THE PERSONAL REPRE-
SENTATIVE OF REED A. BULLOCK, 
Deceased, CLEO H. BULLOCK, 
CLEO H. BULLOCK, individually, 




Third Judicial Cicrict 
MAY - 7 1997 
SALT LAKE C0JN7" 
KJWWA 
ORDER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 960901457CV 
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
2 
The Motion to Dismiss of defendants Beatty and Bullock came before the Court 
for argument on the 24th day of February, 1997, the said Motion being treated as a Motion for 
Summary Judgment by the Court. 
Following arguments by counsel the Court ruled that the Motion to Dismiss Cleo 
Bullock as Personal Representative of the Estate of Reed A. Bullock was well taken and should 
be granted; also that the position of the defendants that the causes of action for conspiracy 
should have the same statute of limitations as the causes of action for simple fraud; that the 
position of the defendants that Faye Beatty and Cleo Bullock were not limited partners was not 
sufficiently certain and would be deferred, and that the claim of ratification of the agreement for 
sale of the property involved was to be taken under advisement. 
Thereafter and on April 3, 1997, the Court caused a Minute Entry to be made 
containing the Court's ruling and based thereon, the Court finds as follows: 
1. The defendants' letter of January 13, 1992, together with the voucher on 
the check delivered to the plaintiff on or about September 10, 1992, fully informed the plaintiff 
as to the sale of the property and the division of the proceeds, including the payment made to 
the plaintiff. 
2. Plaintiff took no action thereon until March 1993, giving no indication to 
the defendants of nonacceptance of his share of the proceeds of the sale or any objection to the 
sale having been made. 
3n 
3 
3. Defendants distributed the proceeds of the sale and relied on the fact of 
sale, there having been no objection made. 
4. It appears that Cleo H. Bullock was not appointed personal representative 
of the estate of her deceased husband and there is an absence of proof that there was any 
substantial estate of Reed A. Bullock. 
5. As to whether Faye Beatty and Cleo Bullock were limited partners of the 
Bullock and Beatty Associates partnership, no ruling is made. 
6. The First and Second Causes of Action allege conspiracy to commit fraud 
against the plaintiffs interest and specific allegations of fraud are contained in Causes of Action 
3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9, the Seventh Cause of Action alleging that the contract was void and the 
Tenth Cause of Action alleging negligence. 
7. Allegations of fraud and unlawful activity are contained in the general 
allegations of the Complaint in paragraphs 27, 28, 31(a), 31(c), 32, 33, 37, 38 and 40. 
Based upon these findings, the Court concludes that: 
1. Cleo Bullock is not properly named as the personal representative of the 
Estate of Reed A. Bullock. 
2. The question of whether Faye Beatty and Cleo Bullock were limited 
partners is not sufficiently established by the pleadings and affidavits. 
>SV 
3. The statute of limitations of three (3) years as to fraud is applicable to the 
First and Second Causes of Action alleging conspiracy to commit fraud as well as to the 
allegations of fraud per se. 
4. The information which the plaintiff had coupled with his inaction amounted 
to ratification of the agreement and the sale of the Provo Canyon property. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED: 
1. Based upon ratification of the sale by the plaintiff, the entire Complaint 
should be dismissed as to the defendants Beatty, the Estate of Reed A. Bullock and Cleo H. 
Bullock individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Reed A. Bullock. 
2. Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as Amended) is also a bar 
as to all the causes of action against these individual defendants except Causes of Action 7 and 
10; and as to those two Causes of Action, no decision is made as there has not been sufficient 
argument based upon the general allegations of the Complaint and their possible reference to 
these two Causes of Action. 
DATED this "] day of April; 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
this day of April, 1997: 
/^c^I'v'X 
SANDRA N. PEULER, District Judge. 
KEVIN V. OLSEN, Attorney for Plaintiff 
b * { 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing proposed ORDER ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT was served on the plaintiff this It day of April, 1997, by mailing true and 
correct copies thereof via United States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to: 
Kevin V. Olsen, Esquire 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003-2230 
Martha S. Stonebrook, Esquire 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for the State of Utah Dept. of Transportation, 
Eugene H. Findlay, Craig Zwick, P.K. Mohanty, Dean W. 
Holbrook, and Alan W. Dearden 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 






Richard B. Bullock 40&.a54*4« 
Attorney At Law 
160 SARATOGA AVE 
LOS GATOS,CA 95030 
January 13, 1992 
Alan W. Dearden 
Utah Department of Transportation 
Right of Way Division 
4301 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119-5998 
Re: Purchase from Bullock & Beatty, Associates, 
A Limited Partnership, of 50.25+ acres in 
Provo Canyon, Utah, 
Dear Mr. Dearden: 
You will recall in our telephone conversation of 
January 2, 1992, I discussed with you the fact that I, a 
general partner, had not signed any of the documentation 
agreeing to sell the Provo Canyon real property to the 
State of Utah. In addition, my mother's signature (also 
a general partner) was signed through a power of attorney 
that she gave to J. Vance Beatt$. Not only is the power bf 
attorney flawed and defective in numerous areas, but my 
mother's interest in the property is held in the Bullock 
Family Trust of which the trustees are my brother, Steven 
K. Bullock, my sister, Barbara Jane Maires, and myself. 
Pursuant to our telephone conversation that alI 
of the general partners1 signatures are required when al1 
of the partnership property is sold or transferred, I FaVe 
enclosed herein for your review and inspection the following: 
1. Limited Partnership Agreement of Bullock & 
Beatty Associates, A limited Partnership. 
Although this is not a fully executed copy, I am 
sure that it is identical to the executed original, which I 
believe J. Vance Beatty has in his possession. 
You will note that I, Bert K. Bullock (my father, 
who died in October 1990), Reed A. Bullock (my uncle) and 
J. Vance Beatty (my uncle) are the general partners. 
Before my f a t h e r s death, he and my mother, Marie 
B. Bullock, established two trusts. The canyon property was 
put into the trust of which my father was the trustee. As I 
3 K1 
Page Two 
Alan W. Dearden 
Re: BULLOCK & BEATTY ASSOCIATES 
stated above, upon his death, my brother, Steven K. Bullock, 
my sister, Barbara Jane Maires, and myself became the trustees 
of that trust, it is called the Bullock Family Trust. There-
fore, at this time, my mother can convey no ownership interest 
in the property. We three trustees must do that. 
As I stated above and in my telephone conversation 
with you, all of the general partners must sign in order to 
sell all of the partnership property. The Provo Canyon property 
is all of the partnership property. You will note that Paragraph 
2.4 states that restriction and provides in part: 
2.4 Restriction on Powers of General Partners. 
The General Partners may not without the consent 
of all General Partners do any act in contravention of 
this agreement or which would make it impossible to carry 
on the ordinary business of tne partnership (my unaernningj 
...; or assign or transfer any of the Partnership property 
for oTKer than a Partnership purpose except to exchange1 
Partnership property for other property (my underlining). 
Paragraph 2.3 entitled Powers,sets forth what a 
majority of the partners may do in essentially the day-to-day 
management and control of the partnership business. Nothing in 
Paragraph 2.3 would override the provisions of Paragraph 2.4. 
2. Copies of Sections 15009 and 15010, with annota-
tions, from the California Corporations Code"! 
These partnership code sections are taken from the 
Uniform Partnership Act, which I believe, Utah has also 
adopted. 
You will note that these two sections require all 
general partners to execute any document which would make it 
impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the partnership. 
The Provo Canyon property comprises the partnership and all of 
its activities. Any transfer requires all general partners to 
sign. 
In conclusion, as I stated in my telephone conversation 
with you, any sale of all of the Provo Canyon property owned by 
Bullock & Beatty Associates, requires the signature of all of the 
general partners -- not just Reed A. Bullock and J. Vance Beatty, 
but, also, myself, and rather than my mother, Marie B. Bullock, 
the three trustees of the trust in which her one-fourth interest 
is held, who are my brother, Steven K. Bullock, my sister, 




Alan W. Dearden 
Re: BULLOCK & BEATTY ASSOCIATES 
I 
If you have 
information 
hope that this clarifies this particular issue, 
any questions, or if you require any additional 
that I might have, please let me know. 
I have not yet received any information from you 
and would appreciate receiving whatever you are able to pro-




< ^ < 
RICHARD B. BULLOCK 
RBB/kl 
CC: Marie B. Bullock. 
Reed A. Bullock. 
J. Vance Beatty. 
Steven K. Bullock. 
Barbara Jane Maires. 
"EXHIBIT *C* 
P. 3 ^ 
Tab 4 
534 I 
BULLOCK AND BEATTY ASSOCIATES e*o I 
BERT K. BULLOCK fi 
261 NORTH 600 EAST 373-4283 [ 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 31-1/1240 I 
Sept. 10
 1Q92 I 
PAY B 
ffffSng3ICHA3D BUI LOCK t $ f 67 ,£98.43 _' j 
Sixty Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety Eight and *f 3/100 DPI i ARS ft 
FtTSt F,r* Security B*nko{ Utah S^S S^ I ^* s^S^L^/frf /) I 
Security n hie** Dm™* /s^ri Ji sw^ /S^A,PJ/ J? I 
FOR Sale of Provo Canyon Property / / . " " ^^^^^^ ^ 3 ~^^&hc* " " | 
»
, OOQ53t < i t a - i : tg l ,OOOOtEi :033 Ql/gi77 Zl# V R 
Sale of Provo Canyon Property $510,000.00 
Less taxes to closing Date 691,62 
Check received fron State of Utah in full 509,308.38 
1/k paid to Marie Bullock $127,327.10 
1/k paid to Seed A. Bullock 127,327.10 
l/k paid to J. Vnnce Beatty 127,327.10 
1/k phid to Richard 3ullock .. less 
payment of note plus interest (due and payable 
on sale of canyon property) to Reed Bullock 60,128.67 




U T A 1PARTMENT OF T R A . ORTATION 
RIGHT OF WAY CONTRACT 
l Cr 
:ovo uvn 
Station. *o Station. .Project No. J E z Q i l Q H 
.Side. :f Highway Parcel No. m Q * i 3; T 
-^t» October 25, 1991 ffnllork f, Bftattv associates «. Grantor. 
4 X. George, i'tah 34770 426-1991 
M,V Q19:18:T VTarrancv Deed 
TVPf Of tNSTRUMtNT 
ever property described in said deed -H±lL_h£ 
deed fcr a tract cf lana fcr transocnaticn ourpeses 
delivered to Alan Dearden 
Acquisit ion Agent 
riTli 
• M M * Of AGfNT 
as escrow agent, with instructions ic deliver said deea TC 
the Utah Department of Transportation, 4501 South 2700 West, 2nd Fleer North, Salt Lake City, Utah S4W9. 
upon the delivery to said escrow agent, for the undersigned y~*«™ cf a ccpy cf this agreement 
property executed and approved by the Department of Transportation. 
N CONSIDERATION of the foregoing, ana other considerations n#f#»r>oh»r tot forth it is mufuoiiv ogreed Pv me penes nereto as »o«iows. 
' Soid tract or land is grontea free ana clear of all l«en* ana encumprances ono oortioi retooses tor iota troct or tono ihotl be furmsned to •<*• 
r«oorim«m or Transportation, ana the totoi omounr in casn settlement snail bo oo»a to the grantor e*cept sucn portion tr*ereor as tne grantor may os*«gn to 
3 'ton noioor m ootaming tne oortioi releases. 
Z All wor« oono unotr ttvs ogreement snail conform to oil OPPiicoole buiidmg. tire ono sonitory lows oramances ono regulations reiotmg to swen WCK• 
r-.o snoti Pe oono m o gooo ana wommonme monnor 
3 All structures, improvements or otn«r facilities wntn r t m o v M ana reiocotea or reconstrudea Ov i n * Deportment c* *'on*portotion tnan oe >e'» **- ot 
?ooa conaition as tound. 
4 No worn, improvement attorotion or motntenonce will b« oono or moat o«nor rhon or m odditton to tnot prov»oea tor m mis ogreement 
5 Tho parties novo hmrm sot out th# wnote ot* thotr agreement. th« performance of this ogreement constitutes tn# entire cons»oerorion for ir-e gront ot 
joid troct of iond ond shall relieve th* Deportment of Trontporrotion of oil further oPiigottont or ciotmt on that occounr. cr an account of the location, groao 
and construction of tho proposed highway. 
6. If ono wnen possession is taken Ov it of the soid tract of Iond hereinaoove referred to. the Oeoortment of Transportation snail comply wiin tne 
following: 
(A) AMOUNT Pay cash in f u l l to the grantors for the fol lowing: 
An en t i re tract of land containing 50.25± acres as 
described in Warranty Deed 019:18:T and a l l improvements 
and a l l water rights 
The Grantors agree to pay a l l 1991 property taxes assessed 
against parcel 18:T 
$510,000.00 
^APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION ITEMS: 
!BY 
DISTBIC7 DJUfCTQg Total Cash Settlement $ 510 .000 .00 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this agreement the day and year first above written. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Recommended for Approve 
 f r r al A 
«r ( ih^f *J . /JjlAji'.QjU^ 
< SiGHT OF WAY ACQUISITION AGiNT "*"•* 
ItF. fi.GMr OF WAfr DIVISION OAff 
it is understoca by tho parties hereto that mis 
instrument it on option until appr ised pv tne Director 
cf Tron 
oy w / r 
ZHl f 
Aoorcved by , *^-+<f 





OtHSlT/S" O.I C * A N T 0 » . 
UTAH DEPARTMENT Z7 TRANSPORTATION 
OFFER TO PURCHASE RIGHT OF 7AY 
:-r::^c: ::c. r-cir-'zi. Parcel :ro. .i?:::;7 
7wner: BULLOCK AND EEATTY ASSOCIATES 
The Utah Department of Transportation hereby makes you an :ffer 
of 
$ 510,000.00 
as the purchase price for the tract (s) of land described m Utah 
Department of Transportation Project shown above. You are not 
required to vacate your property until payment of the purchase 
price has been made available to you. 
Your signature en the Offer to Purchase is only for the purpose 
of verification that such an offer has been made to you and does 
not prejudice your right to have the final amount determined 
through condemnation proceedings in the event you do not accept the 
Statefs offer. Information regarding your rights in Condemnation 
proceedingsis explained in the brochure, "Your Highways and You", 
presented to you at t&is time. 
THIS IS NOT A CONTRACT TO PURCHASE BUT MERELY AND OFFER TO PURCHASE 
FOR THE AMOUNT INDICATED ABOVE. 
Date O c f ZS,/f7; fiv (JUU^CJ) ,j)j A^JS-^ 
Acquisition Agent 
Received a copy of the above offer this day of. 
R-~S4 
7 - o n 
EXHIBIT * 3 • 
— -A DEPARTMENT '••** KANSL '.ION 
GRANTOR: 3ULIDCK AND BSATTY r.BZZZ . PROJECT: 7-015- 21%. 
PARCELS) *-rO. 019:IS:r 
The following information is the basis for the amount estimated by the 
Utah Department of Transportation to ce ;ust compensation. 
(a) Identification of the real property to be acquired: •'location, 
before size, size of parcel to be acquired, after acquisition size) 
Ownership Size: 50.25 ±, 
SIZE OF ACQUISITION REMAINDER 
TYPE OF INTEREST ACQUIRED SQ.FT/ACRE LT/RT 
Warranty Deed PARCEL NO. 18 :T 50.25±, 
(b) Identification of improvements including fixtures which are to be 
acquired. 
BUILDINGS: River Bend Trailer Park with all improvements 
LANDSCAPING/YARD: 
(c) Real property impr. including fixtures not owned by the owner of 
the land. NONE 
'd) Impr. taken that will be replaced/or constructed as part of project. 
NONE 
'e) Summary of fair market value: 
1. Land S285.000. 30 
2 . Improvements . TRAILER PARK $225.000.J0 
3. Damages $ 0 
4. Less Special Benefits $ 0. 
5. TOTAL= £ 510.0CC.30 
'f) The Utah Department of Transportation declares that this cffer is 
the amount that has been established by the Department as just 
compensation and is in accordance with applicable State laws and 
requirements. Just compensation is defined as the fair market value of 
the property taken, plus damages, if any, to the remaining property, 
less any benefit which may accrue to said property by reason cf the 
construction of the highway. A 
DATE: dd ZS.rft} [jJU^ L^.s.KSunJj** 
R-62/Rev. 4/90 Right-of-Way Acquisition Agent 
S i m i l a r t o 1m 
10 t'tbk pg . /17 
Wor tua r ly ; » i j . .JI~"..I..*. *v P r o j e c t i»o. ~ - 0 i ? ( 3 1 ) 
ILiu i i tcu r a r u i ^ r y n i p ) 
lUtah County 
iiullocfc and L»-atty ASSL<:: ate-*, : L i a i t t c l 1 a n ur r i a i i p , ' J r a n l o r s 
a pe rpo tU ' : ' »M jtMuouC, «i»»*ii ;• ,«L OI c-.ti f - : - i in : t;:ac-t •••- i / i 'op^ruy, m Lna o& .^/.V^ 
o t S e c t i o n .-.o, *. i» w*.f - . - • : . , />•;...;..< **. , i:? Clan o o u n i y , Utah, ' ior t n c 
p u r p o s e -?L c.'f-'. f u c t i n . , '•.••••• 1 /uc i i i i ; , t ' - v - j n i . * ^ r . p i - i c i a * ;aiu M a i n t a i n i n g 
t n e r e o n , trie r c i o c a r i o n •>£ r.ne S a l t :. ike r.: |uc.iuct :nd a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s 
t n e r e o t iiicii»»-?ut t o tn-2 -?•»•••.» u^ti .vu o i ::ri •.\^.v /^^'..^/ ;.:.«;.*n • ••-> T r o j ^ c t *»o. u i ' J . 
Sa iu p a r r o l an eni.i** ? n - : t J S a :'.i:rip o i : : :nc »3.U ft:, wir.c iu jo in in j^ 
n o r t n e r i y t n e l o J i c ^ i a . • v L ^ O O p o r t i o n '.»i tin* u o r t n - i / J y r i ^ n t o i way ana 
l i m i t e d - a c c e s s * l i n e o i the* • i v . is^inj j l i i j jhvay: 
lisfzirmir.* at: - i«oir'. / ' , « : .'r# y.vi'i '!».•: i •••.•! \» J •, ' • . i - f ' J i n o r t h e r l y iroai l u e 
o « n t e r l i n « '»]. *•* id p r r j ^ c i •*• •£»:',!. ivs •.;•.• !.'t.?«.?o»i .".! 7 + J 5 . 0 0 , s a i d p o i n t o£ 
be;;\nt>in;; i s .-»rprox I ••.->t«H •  3 / i I t . ••crtii >•••• . ' ' J f; . *.<..'-t *roc; fr.p c e n t e r of 
s a i d S e c t i o n ±h; th«iit;.- . . •':.< . •1 | ,)3M V- • *•!*.«• Cl". •-•-• * p o i n t ot^ t a r d e n c y w i t h 
a y j i . ' w - C o o t raoiu-s •;«?rv- «.o t*.* l«-?t; t in iie;« w e s t e r l y '•Ufc.Ui> £ c , more o r 
l o s s , alonjj t i ie a r c <u r»-.j'.« <MJ;V* I . \n.: ; , w : t t^uindsry l i n e a" Nie V i v i a n i 'ark 
.s:iiici sit*-*4 «»t" f-!,,n «:.-,., ^.... :.}••».:• .-»! ' r - .u . i l r r i v n (now .••.Dfii»«»or.o.d) • 'a ie above 
aoscr i i ioci s t r i p <*C Ian .i.r-»v-- '•.».» .•»» i. , ir>»^. o r l e s s . 
a i t * r s i i ' l *iirj".*i'-t : • i <?r , i ton L*.- «• " • • ' t n i c u d on t n e aoove d e s c r i b e d j ' - T t 
o i an e n t i r e t r a c t a t i r.p «xnffi«o r i **• i»» «?i:sli u e p a r t T 2 n t o': I r . ' a i s p o r t a t i o n , 
s a i u J t2 : i uc^crtiue.nt u! ; r:^nsK.»^cai..;-»II JS t n c r c a t t e r r e l i e v e d c^ c any r u n n e r 
c l a i a i oi r!« n a n a Ljr i . o r tu , •ir..i-;r-:^ ; r :::aitjce.n:mce e n j r u o s vhicr . JH-JV a c c r u e 
a^a in r . t s a i l .v.jiii^iuc'* ' - : j '«c«r ixn -».IUI -.piuirl fr'iiHt«t ->arts i i a» r^o t . 
Preparea DV R . C . J / i U / o o P r o o f r e a d ny »'...•»..;. J / l * /o* j 
UiecKea 0y W . C . J . J / l i / c o lyperj by jw j / i ^ / 6 6 
Keviewea by r i .S .M. J / 1 7 / d o 
EXHIBIT ' 3 ^  
^ 
LI) 6o06r page 10"* 
5et. Stas. 3G7 + J<T. ui & 508+5.:. *-• farcei No. ji*:lo:zE 
Norcneriy siae of hignway Project :«o. l:-'Ji*(jl; 
AGREEMENT FOR EASEMENT TO CONSTRUCT AND COVENANT TO MAINTAIN 
(LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; 
Utah County 
Bullock ana Beacty Associates, a Limited Partnership, Grantors, 
THIS AGREEMENT, made ana enterea into this day of 
_ A . D . ifc , by ana between tne UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, first party, at 4501 Soutn 2700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84119, and_ , 
a Limited Partnership of the State of > second party. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, incidental to the construction of an expressway by the first 
party, the first party and the second party had agreed to deposit till 
material in low areas of a certain tract of property owned by said secona 
party* Saia fill material was placed in said areas mutually oenefiting both 
first and secona parties. The filling of portions of tne said property 
resulted in the diminution and destruction of a wetlanas area, and, 
WHEREAS, said destroyed wetlands area needs to be replaced in the near 
vicinity of the former wetlanas area, ana, 
WHEREAS, the tirst party desires to enter and construct the new wetlands 
area facility upon the herematter described portion of said tract of 
property, ana therearter withdraw from said tract after completing tne 
replacement ana restoration of said wetlands, ana, 
WHEREAS, the second party desires to perpetuate and maintain the new 
wetlands area facility upon said tract of property. 
NOW THEREFORE, the second party hereby GRANTS AtfD CONVEYS to the first 
party, A TEMPORARY EASEMENT, upon parp of an entire tract of property, in the 
SEtflW* ot Section 26, T. 5 S., R. 3£., S.L.B.& M., in Utah County, Utah, for 
the purpose of constructing thereon a wetlanas area facility ana appurtenant 
parts thereof incident to the construction of an expressway known as Project 
No. 019. The boundaries of said part of an entire tract are oescribea as 
follows: 
Beginning in the northerly limited-access line of U.S. highway 169 at the 
Southwest corner of said entire tract, which point is approximately 1320 ft. 
west and 230.00 ft. north from the center of said Section 26; thence 
N. 26#25' E. 555.68 ft. ; thence N. 51*18" E. 195.70 ft.; thence d. 84#0i' L. 
206.68 ft.; thence S. 5*59* E. 100.00 ft.; thence S. 84*01' W. 177.J2 ft.; 
thence S. 51*18* W. 144.29 ft.; tnence S. 26*25* W. 436.74 rt. to the 
northwesterly limited-access line of said highway; thence Southwesterly 67.12 
ft. along said northwesterly limited-access line, along the arc of a 
951.474-foot raaius curve to the left, to the northerly limited-access line of 
said highway (Note: Chord to said curve bears S. 50*4il09M W. tor a distance 
of 67.11 ft.); thence N. 89*49,38M W. (which equals property bearing due West) 
30.74 ft. along said iioilfieiiy limited-access line to the point ol beginning. 
The above described part of an entire tract contains 2.01 acre. 
Saia temporary easement shall expire after said wetlands area facility is 
constructed on the above described part of an entire tract at the expense or 
the first party, said first party is therearter relievea of any further claim 
or demana for costs, damages or maintenance charges which may accrue against 
said wetlands area facility and appurtenant parts thereof. 
AND THEREFORE, the second party, for themselves and tor their heirs, 
assigns or successors in interest, AS A COVENANT running with the land in 
perpetuity, agrees to maintain said wetlands area facility and its appurtenant 
parts in good condition after the completion of the construction of saia 
wetlanas area facility upon the hereinabove described part or an entire tract 
of property. 
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